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weapon doctrine to the highest degree of murder would result in
destroying the distinction between the two degrees, and thus, in effect,
invalidate murder in the first degree.
DICK DOYLE
BREACH OF WARRANTY OF FITNESS AS FAILURE OF
CONSIDERATION-MEYER V. LAND
In determining whether a breach of warranty of fitness for purpose
intended can also constitute failure of consideration, we must look
first at the nature of the warranty and the instances in which it has
been deemed part of the primary consideration.1 Both at common
law2 and under the Uniform Sales Act3 an implied warranty of fitness
arises when goods are sold for a specific purpose. That is, when a
buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which he
needs certain goods, and relies on the seller's judgment in procuring
the goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods are suitable for
that purpose.4 It is found, however, that in certain instances this con-
cept does not provide relief to a vendee who discovers that he has
purchased an article which he cannot use.
In England no rescission is permitted for breach of warranty if the
property in the goods has passed to the buyer.5 Thus, if the vendee
finds his purchases unsuitable for the purpose intended, he must seek
recession under a different theory. This theory is failure of considera-
tion. Having had its inception in the law of contracts rather than the
law of sales, this familiar doctrine was placed in an unusual setting by
the court in the leading case of Young v. Cole.6 In that case certain
bonds which the vendor held out to be marketable negotiable instru-
ments were, in truth, worthless pieces of paper. Rescission could not
I By "primary consideration" the writer is referring to that consideration which
must be present before a valid agreement can be'effected under basic principles of
contract law, as distinguished from secondary obligations such as warranties.
'MADDEN, UNIFoEM SALEs AcT 25 (1923); HmLLRD, SALms 254 (1860); 4
MEcim, SALES 1160 (1901); see also Griffin v. Williams, 305 Ky. 18, 202 S.W.
2d 744 (1947).
'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15(1).
'Thus, if the requisite reliance is present and the article fails to meet the
particular use for which it was purchased, the buyer can recover damages on this
type of warranty. For example, see Brandenburg v. Samuel Stores, 211 Iowa 1321,
235 N.W. 741 (1931) (wherein a fur coat, purchased from a retailer, was found
to be unfit as an article of wearing apparel); also see 46 AM. Jun. 529 et seq.
(1943); 2 BENJAMIN, Sales 867 (rev. ed. 1889).
'The leading English case is Street v. Blay, 109 Eng. Rep. 1212 (1831);
VoLD, SA Es 497 (1931); 3 WILLISTON, SA. s 321 (rev. ed. 1948).
'3 Bing. (N.C.) 724, 132 Eng. Rep. 589 (1837) and cases cited therein.
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be given for breach of warranty, but the court held that the vendee
was entitled to regain the money he had paid since the consideration
for which it was given had completely failed. Thus, it would seem
that in Young v. Cole and similar English cases,7 the harsh effect re-
sulting from a denial of rescission for breach of warranty when the
sale is executed is circumvented by utilizing the concept of failure of
consideration.
A situation in which no recovery is allowed for breach of warranty
arises through express disclaimers of implied warranty." That is, free
to contract as they chose, the parties to an agreement often expressly
exclude the right of recovery under any warranty implied by law.9
Express disclaimers have received varying interpretations from dif-
ferent courts.10 In many situations the disclaimers, couched in am-
biguous and technical terms, are clearly prejudicial to the buyer due
to his unequal bargaining power," and his unfamiliarity with the
legal points involved. Therefore, most jurisdictions have placed a
strict construction upon such disclaimers.' 2 In doing so, many courts
have resorted to what amounts to judicial legislation,'3 while others
have again called upon the failure of consideration concept.
A question of express disclaimer arose recently in a Kentucky case,
Mayer v. Land.14 There the plaintiffs had purchased from the de-
fendant certain machinery with which they planned to manufacture
merchantable concrete blocks. The contract of sale stipulated that
"There are no understandings, agreements, representations or war-
ranties express or implied, not specified herein respecting this order."15
The only substantial warranties specified therein concerned defects of
material and workmanship. However, the machinery was wholly in-
'3 W.U=ON, SALES 322, n. 18 (rev. ed. 1948).
'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 71; 46 Am. Jun. 515-516 (1943); see also VoLU,
SAiS 468, esp. n. 84 (1931); 1 WmL ON, SALES 622-624 (rev. ed. 1948).
' Some courts have held that any express warranty in a contract of sale
excludes any implied warranty [46 AM. Jun. 516 (1943); 77 C. J. S. 1161 (1952)].
See also, 1 WILISTON, SALs 625, n. 16 (rev. ed. 1948). On the other hand, the
Uniform Sales Act which has been adopted in the majority of states [VoLD, SAT S
5 (1931); 46 AM. Jun. 198 (1943)] provides that "An express warranty or con-
dition does not negative a warranty or condition implied under this act unless in-
consistent therewith" [Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15(6)]. The act does not, however,
set forth any standards by which inconsistencies between express and implied
warranties may be determined [Amram and Goodman, Some Problems on the Law
of Implied Warranty, 3 SYRAcusE L. BEv. 259, 260 (1951-52)]. See also annota-
tion 164 A.L.R. 1321 (1946).
"Amram and Goodman, Some Problems on the Law of Implied Warranty, 3
SmRAcusE L. 1EBv. 259, 260-263 (1951-52).
'Comment, 57 YA.LE L. J. 1389, 1400 (1947-48).
UVoLD, SALFs 468 (1931).
Note, 1 VAiERBmLT L. B. 467, 469 (1947-48).
"314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W. 2d 988 (1950).
' Id. at 517. 235 S.W. 2d at 990.
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adequate for the purpose intended and, as found by a jury, would not
manufacture merchantable concrete blocks at all. The plaintiff sued
to recover the purchase price, and recovery was allowed, the court
saying that in contracts of this kind limitation of liability must be
plainly expressed; and since the disclaimer was in technical terms,
within a long and formidable document prepared by the seller, the
requisites had not been met. The court indicated that unless it appears
that the inclusion of the express disclaimer was fairly procured, the
stipulation will not be given effect.
The court was not disposed, however, to rest the decision on this
reasoning alone, but applied the failure of consideration concept in a
manner comparable to that of the English courts. In the language of
the court,
. . . to sell a man a machine for manufacturing a merchantable
product that will not accomplish that purpose at all is a breach of
the contract itself rather than a mere breach of warranty.... If the
machine is worthless for the purpose for which it was sold, there is a
failure of consideration."'
The application of the concept of failure of consideration to sales
transactions where the goods are not fit for the purpose intended, al-
though unusual on its face and although infrequently used, seems to
be accepted as sound practice today. It is stated by one authority that:
As a general rule there is an entire failure of consideration
for a contract of sale, where the goods or property bought is entirely
worthless to either party, or where, although of some value, it was
bought for a particular purpose and is worthless for that purpose."
However, only two cases have been found with facts similar to
Meyer v. Land wherein the courts' decisions were substantially the
same as that of the Kentucky court and, thus, in line with the rule as
set out above. The first of these was also a Kentucky case.18 Therein,
the vendee bought an auto-wagon to use on a particular road, only to
discover that the vehicle was unable to pull certain grades. The court,
allowing the vendee to rescind despite the express disclaimer in his
contract, said that the breach "was nonperformance of the contract
of sale itself."19
In the second case, which arose in Michigan, the plaintiff sought
to rescind his purchase of a second-hand automobile.20 A recovery for
breach of warranty was precluded since implied warranties do not
- Id. at 519, 235 S.W. 2d at 991.77 C. J. S. 626 (1952).
" International Harvester Co. of America v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549
(1914).
"Id. at 848, 169 S.W. at 551.
'Bayer v. Winton Motor Car Co., 194 Mich. 222, 160 N.W. 642 (1916).
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apply to the purchase of second-hand machinery.21 However, the court
held that the sale was voidable at the purchaser's option, and said that:
The claim of total failure of consideration necessarily goes
with and relates to the claim of implied warranty that the article was
reasonably fit and adapted to the purpose for which it was purchased
-which was to use as an automobile. =
Rescission for failure of consideration has been considered by some
courts to be a proper remedy when the goods were not suitable for the
purpose intended, even where there was no impediment to a suit for
breach of warranty.23 Other cases, although admitting that rescission
could be had if there were a total failure of consideration, have held
that there was no total failure unless the equipment was not only
worthless for the purpose intended but for "any" purpose;2 and that
consideration has not completely failed if the goods transferred have
a junk value.25 Moreover, a case has been found wherein the holding
seems completely contradictory to the failure of consideration concept.
There it was said that a breach of warranty does not constitute a
failure of consideration, 20 but it is not clear from the opinion whether
the court deciding that controversy meant that breach of warranty
did not constitute a failure of consideration in that particular case, or
could not in any event.
It has been asserted that failure of consideration, being nowhere
accurately defined, is often interposed where a breach of implied war-
ranty is the real remedy.21 Admitting that this is true, it is suggested
that such misapplication was not made in Meyer v. Land. A warranty
is not the consideration for a contract, but a subsidiary obligation.
There is oftentimes but a fine distinction between the two. For ex-
ample, if a vendee bought "a concrete block machine, that will make
600 blocks a day," it might be contended that the machine is the ob-
ject purchased and the output merely a subsidiary warranty. But if
he bought "a concrete block machine that will make 600 blocks a day",
the machine with a certain output would be the consideration. There-
fore, if the machine with the output were the primary consideration
' MEcEm, SALEs 1166 (1901).
"Bayer v. Winton Motor Car Co., 194 Mich. 222 at ........, 160 N.W. 642 at
643 (1916).Swift and Co. v. Redhead, 147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140 (1909); Bank of
Polk v. Wood, 189 Mo. 92, 186 S.W. 1186 (1916); Bewley-Darst Coal Co. v.
Ennis, 169 Ga. 849, 152 S.E. 257 (1930); Holland Furnace Co. v. Gabriel, 102 Pa.
578, 157 A. 373 (1931).
' Laitner Plumbing and Heating Co. v. McThomas, 61 S.W. 2d 270 (Mo.
1933).
L. D. Powell Co. v. Sturgeon, (Tex. Civ. App.) 299 S.W. 274 (1927).
"J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Gidley, 28 S.D. 101, 132 N.W. 711(1911).
'MECEI. , SAIES 691 (1901).
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and the output was not sufficient, relief could be had either for failure
of consideration, or breach of the warranty which, although a promise
in itself, is a part of the primary consideration. Relief should be
granted either for failure of consideration or breach of warranty when
the consideration has a dual aspect, but unless the dual aspect is ap-
parent, failure of consideration should not be used merely as a means
of circumventing harsh express disclaimers. To do so would be to re-
write the contract in the courts.
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